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CHANCING THE ARM TO SAVE THE
FACE: THE FIGHT FOR IRISH GAELIC
RECOGNITION AND ENDING THE
STORMONT DEADLOCK
INTRODUCTION
n January 9, 2017, Martin McGuinness, the deputy First
Minister of the Northern Ireland Executive,
1
resigned in
protest of First Minister Arlene Foster’s refusal to step down.
2
His resignation signaled the beginning of a governmental lock-
down colloquially known as the “Stormont Deadlock.”
3
McGuin-
ness’s political party, Sinn Féin, refused to appoint a deputy, and
First Minister Foster was unable to govern alone under the law.
4
The issues that face the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and
Sinn Féin, the controlling unionist and nationalist parties, re-
spectively, are far-reaching and diverse in nature.
5
The initial
1. The Northern Ireland Executive is the devolved government of Northern
Ireland, consisting of the First Minister, deputy First Minister, two junior min-
isters, and departmental Ministers. See Your Executive, N. IR. EXECUTIVE,
https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/topics/your-executive (last visited Jan.
14, 2018). The Northern Ireland Assembly appoints all of the Executive posi-
tions, with the First Minister and deputy First Minister being nominated by
the largest and second-largest political parties in the Assembly. Id.
2. See Martin McGuinness Resigns as NI Deputy First Minister, BBCNEWS
(Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-38561507.
3. Chris Page, Stormont: All You Need to Know About NI’s Latest Political
Crisis, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-38612860.
4. For more information on the power sharing structure of the Northern
Irish Executive, see The Assembly and The Executive, N. IR. ASSEMBLY,
http://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/the_assembly_and_executive (last
visited Jan. 10, 2019); see also Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act
2006, c. 53, §8, 16B [hereinafter St Andrews Agreement]: “If either the First
Minister or the deputy First Minister ceases to hold office at any time, whether
by resignation or otherwise, the other³(a) shall also cease to old office at that
time, but; (b) may continue to exercise the functions of his [sic] office until im-
mediately before those offices are filled.”
5. In Northern Irish politics, unionist parties are in favor of remaining a
part of the United Kingdom, while nationalist parties are in favor of having
closer ties to the Republic of Ireland, with many wanting to unite Ireland. Gen-
erally, these political affiliations are tied to religion, with Catholics identifying
O
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breakdown in interparty communication occurred due to the
First Minister Foster’s involvement in the Renewable Heat In-
centive scheme and her subsequent refusal to step down after an
investigation.
6
McGuinness, however, laid out a full array of rea-
sons for the necessity of his resignation. In his letter, McGuin-
ness lamented, “The equality, mutuality and all-Ireland ap-
proaches enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement have never
been fully embraced by the DUP.”
7
McGuinness further clarified
that the DUP has “[a] negative attitude to nationalism and to
the Irish identity and culture.”
8
This complaint includes the
longstanding issue of Northern Ireland having no formal Irish
language legislation, making it the only single-language country
in the United Kingdom (UK).
9
This is not the first time that there has been an Irish Language
Act
10
proposed to the Northern Irish Assembly,
11
nor is it the
as nationalists and Protestants identifying as unionists. The current control-
ling parties in the Northern Irish Executive are firmly on opposite ends of the
political spectrum, with the DUP being unionist and Sinn Féin being national-
ist. For more information on the political divide in Northern Ireland, see Mi-
chael Connolly, Political Groupings in Northern Ireland, in POLITICS AND
POLICY MAKING IN NORTHERN IRELAND (John Benyon ed., 1990), available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/connolly.htm.
6. For further reading, see Q&A: What is the Renewable Heat Incentive
Scheme?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-
ireland-38307628. The Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme was a government
incentive that provided financial support to companies that switched from fos-
sil fuel generators to renewable energy generators. Id. The issue that arose
was due to the fact that the renewable fuel was significantly cheaper than the
subsidy, meaning that users could abuse the system and the government over-
spent in the scheme. Id.While this initial disagreement seemingly has nothing
to do with the subsequent and current language dispute, the Renewable Heat
Initiative scheme was the catalyst and should therefore be acknowledged.
7. Letter from Martin McGuinness, Deputy First Minister, Northern Ire-
land Executive, to Robert Newton, MLA, Speaker, Northern Ireland Assembly
(Jan. 9, 2017) (on file with the Sinn Féin Document Library).
8. Id.
9. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland includes
Wales and Scotland, both of which have comprehensive mother tongue legisla-
tion that makes their language co-official languages with English. See Welsh
Language Act of 1993, c. 38 [hereinafter Wales Act]. See also Gaelic Language
(Scotland) Act 2005, (ASP 7) [hereinafter Scotland Act].
10. In Irish, the Act is called “Acht na Gaeilge.”
11. Hardline Version of an Irish Language Act Previously Proposed by SF
Minister, BELFAST NEWS LETTER (July 3, 2017), http://www.newslet-
ter.co.uk/news/hardline-version-of-an-irish-language-act-previously-proposed-
by-sf-minister-1-8037310.
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first time that the DUP has expressed disdain for such legisla-
ture, despite a commitment on paper
12
and international cen-
sure.
13
In recent years, this disdain has been expressed in many
different ways. Some examples include when the DUP Minister
of Agriculture, Environment, and Rural Affairs renamed a naval
ship from Gaelic to English at an unnecessary cost,
14
and when
the party cut funding to Gaelic
15
education classes, only to “find”
the money again before a major election.
16
The DUP believes
that implementing an Irish Language Act is a sign of Irish su-
premacy and has likened giving in to the Act to “feeding a croc-
odile.”
17
Its most logical argument is the cost that an Irish Lan-
guage Act would incur on the tax base,
18
but Sinn Féin believes
that this argument is a cover for the DUP’s purportedly racist
agenda.
19
12. See The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, U.K.³Ir., ch. 6, § 3, Apr.
10, 1998, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 751, available at https://www.taoi-
seach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/NIPeaceAgreement.pdf [hereinafter
Good Friday Agreement]; see also Agreement at St Andrews, annex B, Oct. 13,
2006, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/bi131006.pdf.
13. See Fourth Opinion on the United Kingdom adopted on 25 May 2016 of
the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities, 6 ACFC/OP/IV(2016)005 50 (Feb. 27, 2017).
14. Rebecca Black, Row Erupts After DUP Minister Changes Name of Boat
from Irish to English, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.bel-
fasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/row-erupts-after-dup-minister-
changes-name-of-boat-from-irish-to-english-35088135.html.
15. The Irish-language spelling of “Gaelic” is Gaeilge. See CHRISTOPHER
MOSELEY, ATLAS OF THEWORLD’S LANGUAGES INDANGER (UNESCO Publishing
3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/en/endan-
geredlanguages/atlas (“Irish Gaelic, Original Name: Gaeilge”).
16. Robbie Meredith, Irish Gaeltacht Scheme for Young, ¶Cut by 50,000,’
BBCNEWS (Dec. 23, 2016),
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/row-erupts-after-
dup-minister-changes-name-of-boat-from-irish-to-english-35088135.html.
17. The First Minister of Northern Ireland Arlene Foster said, “If you feed
a crocodile it will keep coming back for more,” in regard to allowing an Irish
Language Act per Sinn Féin’s demand. See DUPWill Never Agree to Irish Lan-
guage Act, Says Foster, BBCNEWS (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
northern-ireland-38881559.
18. Robbie Meredith, Irish Language Act ¶Would Initially Cost 8.5m,µ BBC
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-
39272431.
19. GarethMcKeown, Sinn Féin Again Hit Out at DUP After Irish Language
Bursary Scrapped, IRISH NEWS (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.irish-
news.com/news/northernirelandnews/2017/01/03/news/sinn-fe-in-again-hit-
out-at-dup-after-irish-language-bursary-scrapped-861754/.
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Minority language laws have created controversy all over Eu-
rope, including the UK, since the beginning of decolonization.
20
Given the difficult environment that this has created for native
and minority speakers, the United Nations (UN) has taken a
hard stance supporting minority populations and mother tongue
preservation.
21
The United Nations Educations, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has found this to be such a
problem that it has declared February 21 to be International
Mother Language Day in an effort to “promote linguistic and cul-
tural diversity and multilingualism.”
22
According to UNESCO
data, “More than 50 per cent of the approximately 7,000 lan-
guages spoken in the world are likely to die out within a few
generations, and 96 per cent of these languages are spoken by a
mere 4 per cent of the world’s population.”
23
In Northern Ireland, Gaelic is “extinct as a first language . . .
[and] widely studied as a second language,”
24
and the Republic
of Ireland only has 44,000 people “living in primarily Irish-
speaking areas,” with 77,185 people speaking Gaelic on a regu-
lar basis apart from a classroom setting.
25
This collective data
equates to Gaelic’s being a “Definitely Endangered” language by
the UNESCO standard.
26
In order to better preserve and rejuve-
nate these languages, and with them, minority cultures, the
General Assembly of the UN has called upon nations to “take
measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons be-
longing to minorities to express their characteristics and to de-
velop their culture [and] language.”
27
Furthermore, the General
20. See LukeMastin, LateModern English: Colonialism and the British Em-
pire, HIST. ENG., http://www.thehistoryofenglish.com/history_late_mod-
ern.html (last visited on Nov. 6, 2017).
21. SeeMOSELEY, supra note 15. See also Thousands of Languages Face Ex-
tinction, UN Warns at Start of International Year, U.N. NEWS (Feb. 21, 2008),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/02/249872-thousands-languages-face-ex-
tinction-un-warns-start-international-year (“The agency warned that when a
language fades, so does a part of the world’s cultural tapestry.”).
22. International Mother Language Day, 21 February, U.N.,
http://www.un.org/en/events/motherlanguageday/background.shtml (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2018).
23. SeeMOSELEY, supra note 15.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 4, ¶ 2, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Be-
longing to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Dec. 18,
1992).
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Assembly has directed members to recognize that “persons be-
longing to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities
. . . have the right to enjoy their own culture . . . and to use their
own language, in private and in public, freely and without inter-
ference or any form of discrimination.”
28
In order to fulfill the UN’s goal of preserving and rejuvenating
minority and mother tongue languages, the Unionist DUP party
should compromise with Sinn Féin and entertain some form of
the Irish Language Act. While there are genuine concerns of fi-
nancial hardship
29
and renewed tension, a widespread ac-
ceptance of Irish language and culture needs to be implemented
in Northern Ireland from the top-down to the citizenry to better
promote peace and tolerance. If the end goal is to remain a sep-
arate entity from the Republic of Ireland and at least partially
autonomous from a direct Westminster rule,
30
compromises
must be made between the Unionist and Nationalist parties.
This, however, does not preclude a more balanced article of leg-
islation, which acknowledges both Gaelic and Ulster-Scots, the
other minority language in Northern Ireland. This type of dual
legislation was a proposed compromise from the DUP that Sinn
Féin has rejected in the past.
31
To guide the Northern Irish gov-
ernment in making this legislation, Welsh and Scottish lan-
guage acts should to be used because they are examples of what
has worked in the United Kingdom. These acts should be exam-
ined and tailored for an Irish Language Act with the Unionist
and Nationalist goals in mind, with both sides acknowledging
respect for the other’s culture.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of the Northern Ire-
land conflict and the subsequent uneasy peace that exists in the
country and within its governmental structure. It will also ex-
amine the influence of both the UK and the Republic of Ireland
28. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
29. SeeMeredith, supra note 18.
30. Westminster rule, also known as direct rule or home rule, is the ability
of the British government to intercede in the event of a complete collapse of
the Northern Irish government. See What is Direct Rule for Northern Ireland?,
BBC NEWS (June 30, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40462749. What
this would mean for Northern Ireland is that all laws would have to go through
London ministers to be passed. Id.
31. See Sinn Féin Rejects DUP’s Irish Language Proposal, RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS
ÉIREANN (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0901/901416-stormont.
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on the formation and maintenance of Northern Ireland’s politi-
cal structure. Part II of this Note will discuss the history of Eu-
ropean decolonization efforts. Additionally, Part II will discuss
the push for single-language nations in an attempt to solidify
nationalist power, which subsequently marginalized and subju-
gated minority cultures and mother languages. It will also show
the current trend towards preserving and rejuvenating these
cultures and languages in an attempt to rectify the wrongs of
homogenization and to demonstrate how this push has worked
and failed on an international scale. Part III of this Note will
discuss these preservation and rejuvenation efforts on themicro-
level in Northern Ireland, as they pertained to the Good Friday
Agreement, the St Andrews Agreement of 2006, and most re-
cently, the current Stormont Deadlock. Finally, Part IV will dis-
cuss a viable conclusion to both preserve Irish language and cul-
ture as well as maintain the integrity of Unionist and National-
ist identities.
I. THEUNITEDKINGDOM AND IRELAND: A BRIEF LOOK AT THE
HISTORY OF THE TROUBLES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FORMATION
OF THENORTHERN IRISHGOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
An analysis of why a form of Irish language legislation is nec-
essary to keep Northern Ireland autonomous and at peace ne-
cessitates an historical understanding of the conflict between
the islands of Ireland and Great Britain. The clashing of these
two nations has gone on for centuries, with Great Britain subju-
gating the Irish people throughout the ages. This subjugation
resulted in near-extinction of the mother language, with a resur-
gence only occurring in the late nineteenth century.
32
A. The Colonial Times: Anglo-Norman Invasion of 1169 to the
Great Famine of Ireland
The English occupation of Irish land began in earnest with the
Anglo-Norman invasion in 1169 A.D.
33
Ireland was made up of
small and separate kingdoms with one controlling “High King,”
a title given to the strongest ruler of the smaller kingdoms at the
32. See Muiris Ó Laoire, The Language Planning Situation in Ireland,
MULTILINGUALMATTERS 193, 198 (2008).
33. Gavin Stamp, Neighbors Across the Sea: A Brief History of Anglo-Irish
Relations, BBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
26883211.
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time.
34
This created an internal struggle that culminated in the
ousted and exiled King of Leister, Dermot MacMurrough’s en-
listment of aid from English King Henry II and Lord Strongbow
to regain his throne.
35
After a successful invasion, the English
forces occupied Dublin, where High King O’Connor was unable
to defeat them.
36
Thereafter, King Henry II claimed rule over
Ireland in 1175 under the Treat of Windsor, granting the Irish
rulers limited sovereignty over a small portion of Irish land that
was eventually completely overtaken by English nobles.
37
Even with this conquest, the Irish rulers were still considered
regents of the King of England and possessed the same rights as
other semi-autonomous rulers.
38
The British government’s pres-
ence was strongest in the area known as the Pale, which con-
sisted of the coastline from Dundalk to Dalkey, along with “por-
tions of the counties of Dublin, Meath, Louth, and Kildare.”
39
Generally speaking, however, Ireland remained a mostly auton-
omous colony of England, with each of its smaller territories ne-
gotiating separately with the English King’s regents,
40
even per-
sisting past the time that Henry VIII was titled the of King of
Ireland in 1541.
41
Minor rebellions often beset this fragile peace, but most did
not significantly effect change.
42
In 1594, however, Tyrone’s Re-
bellion, or the Nine Years’ War
43
as it is now known, began when
the Earl of Tyrone and Irish chieftain, Hugh O’Neill, gathered
34. To learn more about Medieval Irish ruling hierarchy, see Gaelic King-
doms³Kingdom of Ireland, HIST. FILES (2018), http://www.histo-
ryfiles.co.uk/KingListsBritain/GaelsIreland.htm.
35. Catherine Hines, Reaping the Turmoil Within: How Ireland’s Kings
Triggered the Anglo-Norman Invasion, 2 TENOR OF OUR TIMES 22, 25 (2013).
36. Id. at 26.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. For more information on the breakdown of English strongholds in Ire-
land, see Ireland: A Colony of Retreat, 1350²1541, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/utk/ireland/retreat.htm (last visited Jan.
14, 2018).
40. Id.
41. Stamp, supra note 33.
42. See Steven Ellis, Turning Ireland English, BBC (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/tudors/elizabeth_ireland_01.shtml.
43. For more information, see PATRICK WESTON JOYCE, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF IRELAND 433²443 (Patrick Weston eds., Longmans, Green, and Co. 1903).
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his allies, including a force of Spanish troops, and started a gue-
rilla war against the British occupiers throughout Ulster.
44
This
rebellion lasted until March of 1603, when the new deputy Lord
Mountjoy managed to turn the tide of conflict and force the Earl
to unconditionally surrender.
45
Another rebellion of this scope
was not seen until 1641, fomented because of the rise of religious
persecution of Catholics in Ireland by the Protestants.
46
After
1641, there began another period of unrest that lasted until 1690
with the end of the Williamite-Jacobite War in Ireland, cement-
ing Protestant, and therefore British, rule.
47
Tied to this religious conflict was the struggle of maintaining
the Irish language. Most of the Catholic poor were Irish-speak-
ing,
48
while the Protestant elite were English speakers and,
therefore, capable of holding better positions of power and offices
in the new Anglo-Irish seat of power.
49
Even the Catholic par-
ishes, however, began sermonizing in English due to the chang-
ing political climate.
50
Consequently, the Irish language slowly
began to decline as more speakers began speaking primarily in
English for better living and career prospects.
51
State-sponsored
schools that only taught English also accelerated this decline
44. See DR. WILLIAM PALMER, THE PROBLEM OF IRELAND IN TUDOR FOREIGN
POLICY 129 (Boydell & Brewer Ltd. 1994). Ulster is a province in Northern
Ireland and a small portion of the Republic of Ireland that is made up of nine
counties. Informally, Ulster is now used as a term for all of Northern Ireland.
Ulster, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ul-
ster (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
45. See PALMER, supra note 44.
46. For more information on the 1641 Rebellion, see David Plant, The Irish
Uprising, 1641, BCW PROJECT (Feb. 28, 2011), http://bcw-project.org/church-
and-state/confederate-ireland/the-irish-uprising.
47. For more information on the Williamite-Jacobite War, see JOHNCHILDS,
A MILITARY HISTORY OF IRELAND 188, (Thomas Bartlett & Keith Jeffery eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
48. See Ó Laoire, supra note 32, at 197.
49. See Éamon Ó Cuív, An Gorta Mór ³ the Impact and Legacy of the Great
Irish Famine, Lecture Delivered at the University of Toronto, Canada 15 (May
8, 2009), available at http://www.irishfamine.ie/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/11/2009-05-08-FINAL-speech-for-University-of-Toronto-
Lecture.pdf.
50. Ian Kennedy, The Decline of the Irish Language in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, Lecture Delivered at the Drew University Atlantic Connections Confer-
ence 33 (Jan. 16, 2015), available at http://www.yeatssoci-
ety.com/news/2015/03/09/the-decline-of-the-irish-language-in-the-nineteenth-
century/.
51. See Ó Laoire, supra note 32, at 199.
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over time, solidifying the British culture at the expense of native
Irish speakers and their culture.
52
The Irish Potato Famine
53
most notably exacerbated this de-
cline.
54
On the eve of the Famine, the percentage of Irish speak-
ers was at its highest because of the population boom in the early
nineteenth century.
55
Out of the 8.5 million people living on the
island, 3.5 million spoke Irish as their native language or of an
equivalent fluency.
56
As the potato blight set in from the late
summer of 1845 up until the early 1850s, however, these num-
bers dramatically decreased due to the subsequent deaths and
emigrations.
57
Specifically, the Irish population decreased over-
all from 8.5 million to 6.6 million people by 1851.
58
Out of that
population, approximately 300,000 reported to only speak Irish,
while over 1.5 million people purported to speak both English
and Irish.
59
These numbers continued to decrease over the years
52. See Kennedy, supra note 50, at 41.
53. The Irish Potato Famine, also known as the Great Famine or an Gorta
Mór in Gaelic, was caused by blight on Irish potatoes from 1845 until the early
1850s. The Irish people, particularly the poor, were reliant on potatoes for food;
with nearly 60 percent of the population’s food needs coming from potato crops.
See Jim Donnelly, History: The Irish Famine, BBC (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/famine_01.shtml. The crop
loss, combined with the British government’s reluctance to help and a ques-
tionable rise in agricultural exports to the UK mainland, led to the deaths of
between 750,000 to one million people, along with a vast migration movement.
For more information on the Irish Potato Famine, see Cuív, supra note 49, at
1²2; see also ERICK FALC’HER-POYROUX, THE GREAT FAMINE IN IRELAND: A
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL DISRUPTION 1²2 (Yann Bévant 2014).
54. For more information on the effects of the Irish Potato Famine on the
population of Irish speakers, see Cuív, supra note 49, at 11²13.
55. Id. at 3²4.
56. FALC’HER-POYROUX, supra note 53, at 2. The exact number of Irish
speakers is disputed due to a lack of good linguistic census data prior to the
Famine. For other estimates, see Cuív, supra note 49, at 15; see also CHRISTINE
KINEALY, ADEATH-DEALINGFAMINE: THEGREATHUNGER IN IRELAND 198 (Pluto
Press 1998).
57. See Cuív, supra note 49.
58. Id.
59. Id. These numbers are more definitive than the pre-1841 estimates be-
cause the census added a language speaker inquiry to the questionnaire. There
are some theories that this was to see how well the gentrification of Ireland
had worked, or to see where the heaviest population lay. For more about the
census, see Matthew Woolward, Language Questions in Ireland, HISTPOP
(2007), http://histpop.org/ohpr/servlet/AssociatedView?path=Browse&ac-
tive=yes&mno=2072&assoctitle=Language%20questions%20in%20Scot-
land&assocpagelabel= (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).
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as the previous effects of social pressure and educational en-
forcement persisted and as more Irish citizens emigrated for bet-
ter prospects.
60
By 1871, only 15 percent of the Irish population
was recorded as Irish speaking.
61
Irish-only speakers continued
to live in poverty³a phenomenon explained by locals in the fol-
lowing way: “Irish [language] will butter no bread,” or “Irish
[language] belongs to the age of the foot-plough and the sailing
ship.”
62
B. Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom: From 1801 to
Present
To understand the political structure of the Northern Irish
government and the political roadblocks to Irish language recog-
nition, one must start from when Ireland and England united
“into one kingdom,” beginning what is now known as the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
63
After the
Irish Rebellion of 1798, the British Prime Minister, William Pitt
the Younger, concluded that unification was necessary for
peace.
64
Pitt brought about the Union Act,
65
bringing together
Britain and Ireland in a way never previously implemented.
66
Unification predictably did not come easily, nor was it popular
on either side of the Irish Sea.
67
The Irish people perceived uni-
fication as a loss of identity and a forfeiture of the semblance of
independence that the Irish Parliament represented.
68
For a
60. See Cuív, supra note 49, at 13.
61. Id.
62. See FALC’HER-POYROUX, supra note 53, at 3 (quoting REGHINDLEY, THE
DEATH OF THE IRISH LANGUAGE 198 (Rutledge 1990)).
63. See Union with Ireland Act 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c. 67, §1 (Eng.).
64. The way this peace would be established is hotly contested, with Irish
scholars claiming the British government wanted a means of abolishing the
Irish Parliament by establishing Home Rule, while British scholars maintain
that it was to give greater weight to “accomodat[ing] Irish interests.” See
PATRICK BUCKLAND, THE ACT OF UNION, 1800: IRELAND IN SCHOOLS (The War-
rington Project 1998), available at http://www.iisresource.org/Docu-
ments/0A5_02_Act_Of_Union.pdf.
65. Id. at 9.
66. See Allan I. Macinnes, Acts of Union: The Creation of the British Empire,
BBC HIST. (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_sea-
power/acts_of_union_01.shtml.
67. See JOYCE, supra note 43, at 474²75.
68. The Irish Parliament was heavily regulated by the British and was often
an ineffective government for the majority of Irish people, both due to internal
and external pressures. Internally, it only adequately represented a minority
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smaller number of British individuals, the concern was racial.
69
They believed Irish labor was cheaper and could undermine
British industry,
70
and others simply did not want to work with
Irishmen in Parliament.
71
The Act’s supporters argued for eco-
nomic prosperity and the modernization of Irish industry that,
up to this point, was almost strictly agrarian.
72
For British sup-
porters, the Act constituted relief from at least one warfront with
France.
73
Battles with France stemming from the French Revo-
lution were stretching Britain thin,
74
and supporters of the Act
recognized that peace with Ireland would mean one less conflict
to worry about, as well as the addition of new troops.
75
Despite opposition and a false start, the bill for the Act of Un-
ion passed both English and Irish Parliaments in 1800 due, in
large part, to unsavory closed-doors dealings and promises that
went unfulfilled.
76
Prime Minister William Pitt’s promise of
Catholic Emancipation, a substantial draw at a time when a ma-
jority of the population could not stand for Parliament,
77
was
broken because of monarchal opposition from Britain.
78
Thus,
of the Irish population due to the enactment of the Penal Laws, which forbade
Catholics from having a voice in Parliament. See IanMachin, British Catholics,
in THE EMANCIPATION OF CATHOLICS, JEWS, AND PROTESTANTS: MINORITIES AND
THE NATION-STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 11 (Rainer Liedtke &
Stephan Wendehorst eds., Manchester Univ. Press 1999). Externally, legisla-
tion in Ireland still had to be approved by the Westminster Parliament, as well
as the British-appointed lieutenant general. For more information, see Hano-
verians: The Union with Ireland, 1800, HIST. PARLIAMENT TRUST,
http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/periods/hanoverians/union-ireland-
1800 (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) [hereinafter Hanoverians].
69. See BUCKLAND, supra note 64.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See THOMASHEYCK&MEREDITHVELDMAN, THE PEOPLES OF THE BRITISH
ISLES: A NEW HISTORY FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 285 (Oxford Univ. Press
2014).
73. See BUCKLAND, supra note 64, at 9²10.
74. Id. See Hanoverians, supra note 68.
75. See generally DESMONDKEENAN, IRELANDWITHIN THEUNION, 1800²1912
17 (Xlibris Corp. 2008).
76. The business dealings came in the form of bought peerages, monetary
“rewards” for disfranchised boroughs (all but thirty-one boroughs were abol-
ished in the Union), and dismissing any of those in opposition from Parliament.
See BUCKLAND, supra note 64, at 13. See also JOYCE, supra note 43, at 473²74.
77. SeeMachin, supra note 68.
78. See JOYCE, supra note 43, at 479. According to Joyce, the King felt that
allowing a Catholic Emancipation would be a “breach to his coronation oath;”
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the same sense of disfranchisement occurred during this period
of union as it had when the Irish Parliament was in effect.
79
Given the rocky history and opposition from the onset, it came
as no surprise when this union between the two countries pro-
duced conflict and attempted rebellion, the first of which oc-
curred a mere year later.
80
The rebellion was short-lived, but it
did reflect the discontent at the treatment of Irish people under
direct British rule.
81
The promised Catholic Emancipation did not come to fruition
until April 1829, nearly three decades after the initial passage
of the Act of Union.
82
While this allowed for Catholic Irishmen
to hold most offices in the government
83
for the first time in a
century, it also contained language that further disenfranchised
a large percent of poorer Catholics by increasing the freeholder
price needed to vote.
84
A measure of relief, however, came in the
form of national education reform in 1832, which greatly ex-
panded educational opportunities for Catholic children.
85
Yet,
the families were still subject to an oppressive tithe tax paid due
to their religious beliefs.
86
All of the tension culminated in the
however, there is some question as to whether Pitt’s attempt to save the Eman-
cipation article was in earnest. Id.
79. See Hanoverians, supra note 68.
80. See JOYCE, supra note 43, at 477.
81. Id.
82. The final vote for emancipation in Westminster occurred when Daniel
O’Connell was voted into Parliament and then not allowed into the building
due to the enacted Penal Laws. See JOYCE, supra note 43, at 483. This action,
done legally, inspired the tide of popular opinion to turn in favor of the Catho-
lics, and the rest of Parliament realized that in order to prevent civil war, it
needed to vote in favor of Catholic Emancipation. Id.
83. SeeHEYCK, supra note 72, at 284.
84. Freeholders were property owners whose land yielded a net income of
forty shillings, or £2. After the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1828 was enacted,
Irish freeholders needed a net profit of 10£ instead, which was much higher
than most Irish landowners could claim. For calculations on how badly the new
law affected Irish voting bases, see STEPHEN FARRELL, THE HISTORY OF
PARLIAMENT: THEHOUSE OFCOMMONS, 1820²1832 (D.R. Fisher ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2009), available at http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/vol-
ume/1820-1832/survey/iv-ireland. See also HEYCK, supra note 72, at 287.
85. The National System provided for same literary teaching but separate
religious teachings in all schools in Ireland, while prior to this schools were
always run as Protestant institutions. It also forbade interference with stu-
dents’ religious education. See JOYCE, supra note 43, at 486.
86. These tithes were called Church-rate or Church-cess, and they were paid
out to keep Protestant churches in repair. If a Catholic citizen was unable to
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Tithe Wars, where many tithe-collectors were tortured and mur-
dered, the rest of the community shunned tithe-payers, and po-
lice officers that tried to intervene were killed.
87
This, in turn,
led to the massacre of many peasants who were part of the up-
risings.
88
The conflict went on until 1838, when the tithe was
reduced by a quarter.
89
Additionally, Irish landlords collected
the tithe with their rent instead of by tithe-collectors. The tithe
itself, however, was not abolished completely until 1869 with the
Irish Church Act.
90
In 1910, the Irish Parliamentary Party presented Parliament
the first Home Rule Act to allow an Irish government to form on
Irish soil in an effort to rectify some of the past wrongs against
the Catholic majority.
91
It would be the first of three similar acts
presented to Parliament, with the Home Rule Act finally being
enacted in 1914, only to be temporarily suspended at the onset
of World War I.
92
During World War I, an opportunity presented
itself to the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB),
93
a group that
pay, his or her cattle, furniture, and other goods were seized to make up the
difference. See JOYCE, supra note 43, at 487.
87. See RICHARD BARRY O’BRIEN, IRISHWRONGS AND ENGLISH REMEDIES 242
(Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1887).
88. Id.
89. See JOYCE, supra note 43, at 487.
90. See THE COURSE OF IRISHHISTORY 375 (T.W. Moody & F.X. Martin eds.,
Mercier Press 1967); see also Irish Church Act 1869 c. 42; see also What Was
the Easter Rising?, RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS ÉIREANN (2013), https://www.rte.ie/centur-
yireland/index.php/articles/what-was-the-easter-rising (last visited Jan. 16,
2019).
91. The Home Rule Act was, unsurprisingly, not popular with Ulster
Protestant Unionists, who believed it would give the Catholics too much power
if the government was maintained in Dublin. This led to the formation of the
Ulster Volunteer Force, a paramilitary group dedicated to stopping home rule.
See Brendan Lynn, Chronology of Key Events in Irish History, 1800 to 1967,
CAIN, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch1800-1967.htm (last visited Oct.
6, 2018).
92. Id.
93. In the leaders’ own words, the IRB is an organization dedicated to “es-
tablish[ing] andmaintain[ing] a free and independent Republican Government
in Ireland,” so long as that is the will of the people. See Joseph E.A. Connell,
History³Irish Republican Brotherhood, IRISH REPUBLICAN BROTHERHOOD,
http://www.irishrepublicanbrotherhood.ie/history-irb.html (last visited Nov.
29, 2018). The IRB was primarily responsible for organizing Easter Rising;
however, the fighting force was supplemented with rebels from other groups,
including the Irish Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers. Id.
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wanted full Irish independence and a united Ireland.
94
The War
led to the 1916 Easter Rising and subsequent execution of Irish
nationalist leaders.
95
Ironically, while the tide of popular opinion was against the
rebels during the Rising, the execution of key leaders led to a
shift in public opinion towards supporting Irish independence
from British rule.
96
This shift in public opinion was the catalyst
to the 1919 Irish War of Independence,
97
which paved the way
for the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that gave Irish independence
to the southern part of the island.
98
The northern portion of Ire-
land, including Ulster, chose to remain in the United Kingdom.
99
With this division, the United Kingdom of England and North-
ern Ireland was created.
The official government of Northern Ireland, as a part of the
United Kingdom, was established in the form of the Northern
Ireland Parliament, which was a Unionist-controlled govern-
ment that maintained most social services and law and order.
100
In 1974, the Northern Ireland Parliament was abolished by the
94. See Lynn, supra note 91.
95. Easter Rising, or the Rising as it is colloquially known, was an act of
rebellion that started on Easter Monday 1916, where more than a thousand
rebels overran Dublin and took over key municipal buildings, including the
Post Office. See What Was the Easter Rising?, supra note 90; see also Rozina
Sabur, Easter Rising: How the 1916 Insurrection Shaped Modern Irish History,
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/2016/03/24/easter-rising-centenary-how-the-1916-insurrec-
tion-shaped-modern/. Once the rebels controlled these buildings, they pro-
claimed Ireland a republic and set up a provisional government. Id. The rebel-
lion only lasted five days, but the death toll was over 400 people, including the
execution of fifteen rebel leaders. For more information on Easter Rising, see
id.
96. Id.
97. The war officially began when IRA members killed two Royal Irish Con-
stabulary stationed in Tipperary, Ireland, on January 19, 1919. For more in-
formation on the beginning of the war, see Nationalism and the War of Inde-
pendence, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpa-
pers/themes/nationalism-war-independence.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
98. For more information about war itself, see The Anglo-Irish War, BBC
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/after-
math/af04.shtml.
99. UK Politics Quarter Century After First Assembly’s Fall, BBC NEWS
(May 28, 1999) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/354539.stm [here-
inafter UK Politics].
100. Id.
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British government due to its ineffectiveness, which was demon-
strated by its handling of the 1972 Bloody Sunday massacre.
101
In its place, direct rule from Westminster was reinstated as a
temporary measure.
102
This direct rule would continue until, af-
ter multiple false starts,
103
the Good Friday Agreement was
signed in 1999.
104
The government set up after the Good Friday Agreement’s en-
actment includes the ninety seats in the Northern Ireland As-
sembly,
105
eighteen seats in the British Parliament, and eleven
local district seats.
106
The Northern Irish Executive consists of
Ministers who are in charge of running the local government
functions. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, col-
lectively known as the Executive Office, lead the Northern Irish
Executive.
107
The number of seats that each party wins in the
Assembly election determines the proportionality of the political
parties in the Executive.
108
As of April 2019, neither the First
Minister nor the Deputy First Minister seat is filled since the
101. Bloody Sunday occurred on January 30, 1972, when demonstrators
marched down the streets of Derry in protest of Unionist gerrymandering and
internment practices against Catholics. Fourteen people were killed when
British paratroopers open fire, posted there because Northern Irish forces were
unable to control the town. For more information, see Archive: Bloody Sunday,
BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/bloody_sunday (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
102. See Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 c. 22, available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/22/pdfs/ukpga_19720022_en.pdf.
103. The Good Friday Agreement was only signed after two years of discus-
sions, and it only came about after the Irish Republican Army, a militaristic
Nationalist group, vowed to stop bombings in the early 1990’s. For more infor-
mation, see What Was the Good Friday Agreement?, BBC (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/14118775.
104. The Good Friday Agreement, signed by both the Republic of Ireland and
the United Kingdom, acknowledges Northern Ireland’s ability to choose their
own country based on popular vote. See UK Politics, supra note 99.
105. The Northern Ireland Assembly is the legislative branch of the govern-
ment. The seats are allocated based on a proportional democracy by popular
vote. See The Northern Ireland Assembly, N. IR. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
106. See The Assembly and the Executive, N. IR. ASSEMBLY, http://educa-
tion.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/the_assembly_and_executive (last visited Jan.
9, 2019).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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late Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, resigned and
forced First Minister Arlene Foster to leave the office.
109
The collapse of the Northern Irish Executive stemmed from a
variety of issues, but the main sticking point to this day has been
the Irish Language Act.
110
Without Sinn Féin, the second most
powerful political party in Northern Ireland, the power-sharing
government cannot operate.
111
Sinn Féin will not nominate a
Deputy First Minister until the Unionist party agrees to a form
of Irish Language recognition.
112
The UK has the power to bring
direct rule back to Westminster if the Northern Irish political
parties do not come to an agreement, but it has allowed five
deadlines to pass without imposing this governance.
113
Westmin-
ster and Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State James Broken-
shire,
114
however, have opted to implement a budget in Northern
Ireland in order to keep the currently deficient government run-
ning.
115
Neither the majority of Northern Ireland’s population
nor that of the Republic of Ireland will accept a Home Rule op-
tion.
116
The alternative to restored power-sharing is a snap vote
109. First Minister Arlene Foster was unable to lead on her own due to
Northern Ireland’s power-sharing structure For more information on the
power sharing structure, see Power Sharing, N. IR. ASSEMBLY, http://educa-
tion.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolution/gfa/power_sharing
(last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
110. See Page, supra note 3.
111. See Power Sharing, supra note 109.
112. See Sinn Féin Rejects DUP’s Irish Language Proposal, supra note 31.
113. See Iain McDowell, Stormont Deadlock: What You Need to Know, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-
41723268.
114. On January 8, 2018, James Brokenshire resigned from the role of Sec-
retary of State of Northern Ireland due to ill health; his replacement as of the
writing of this Note is Karen Bradley. See Amanda Ferguson, UK PM May
Names New Northern Ireland Minister After Brokenshire Resigns, REUTERS
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-politics-nire-
land/british-northern-ireland-secretary-brokenshire-resigns-on-health-
grounds.
115. Henry McDonald, Westminster Imposes Budget on Northern Ireland,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/nov/13/northern-ireland-minister-james-brokenshire-steps-closer-
to-transferring-power-london-regional-budget.
116. Elaine Edwards, Mary Minihan, & Vivienne Clarke, Leo Varadkar, UK
Election Results Should Rule Out Hard Brexit, IRISH TIMES (June 9, 2017),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/leo-varadkar-uk-election-
results-should-rule-out-hard-brexit-1.3113685.
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for Irish unification of the entire island, which could lead to an-
other civil war and is an outcome that many Unionist Northern
Irish would not accept.
117
Given that the major sticking point is
the Irish Language Act, it is necessary to understand why this
and mother tongue legislation, in general, is such a hot button
issue.
II. THEHISTORY OF CULTURALHOMOGENIZATION IN EUROPE,
INCLUDINGMOTHER ANDMINORITY LANGUAGE SUPPRESSION
AND ERADICATION
To understand why minority language preservation is a fun-
damental part of cultural heritage, it is necessary to survey the
historical suppression of said languages, both in Ireland and on
the greater European continent. It is also necessary to examine
efforts to remedy these past injustices on the international scale,
as well as States’ responses to their international obligations to
preserve and protect these languages.
A. History of Mother Language/Minority Language Suppres-
sion
The concept of a unified language as a means of cultural ho-
mogenization is not a new concept.
118
The rise of consolidated
nation-states and colonial conquest created a need for “linguistic
homogeneity” on the part of the conquering power in order to
create a single national identity, as well as an innate sense of
cultural and linguistic superiority.
119
The noted linguist, Peter
Trudgill,
120
explained this phenomenon perfectly when he said,
“linguistic subjugation (or unification, depending on one’s point
of view) is . . . an important strategy in implementing political
117. See Stephen O’Brien,Northern Non-Voters Prefer to Stay in UK, SUNDAY
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/ireland/northern-
non-voters-prefer-to-stay-in-uk-ldcnc6gjh.
118. See generally Ranka Bjeliac-Babic, Languages: Conflict or Coexistence?
6,000 Languages: An Embittered Heritage, UNESCO COURIER, Apr. 2000, at
18, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/im-
ages/0011/001194/119473e.pdf#page=17.
119. Id.
120. Peter Trudgill is a noted professor and widely published author on the
subject of sociolinguistics. For more information on Trudgill’s body of work, see
Talking Norwich!, UNIV. E. ANGLEA, https://www.uea.ac.uk/lcs/research/re-
search-groups/talking-norwich (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
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subjugation (or unification).”
121
UNESCO estimates that any-
where between 30,000 and 500,000 native languages have died
out since records have been kept.
122
In the past 300 years, Eu-
rope alone has lost twelve native languages,
123
Australia has lost
230, and Brazil has lost 540 since the Portuguese conquest.
124
Another factor that plays into language homogenization in the
new world is the rise of industry, technology, and science and
the research of all disciplines that takes place across state bor-
ders since the nineteenth century.
125
This, in turn, has affected
school systems worldwide because of the increased necessity of
international students to learn the dominant language, which
has furthered governments’ concepts of language and cultural
homogeneity. As the anthropologist, Zvi Bekerman,
126
explains,
school systems help “unif[y] different local groups they were suc-
cessful in subordinating to their power, under one flag, one lan-
guage, and one narrative.”
127
Additionally, the rise of technolog-
ical and scientific development globally has raised “failure to
communicate” issues, leading some scholars to dismiss concerns
about language preservation and to advocate for a mono-linguis-
tic global society.
128
Some scholars, such as Ranka Bjeliac-
121. See Zhenja La Rosa, Language and Empire: The Vision of Nebrija, LOY.
U., STUDENT HIST. J. (2003), http://www.loyno.edu/~history/journal/1995-
6/rosa.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2019).
122. See Bjeljac-Babic, supra note 118.
123. This is a low number could conceivably due to the fact that most con-
quering nations came from the European continent, thereby preserving more
European languages. As this Note will explain, that does not negate the danger
some native European languages still face.
124. See Bjeliac-Babic, supra note 118.
125. Id.
126. Zvi Bekerman is an anthropology professor at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem and published author whose main body of work focuses on the an-
thropology of education and cultural identity. For more information on Beker-
man’s work, see Zvi Bekerman, ACADEMIA, http://zvibekerman.academia.edu/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
127. See ZVI BEKERMAN&MICHALINOS ZEMBYLAS, PSYCHOLOGIZED LANGUAGE
IN EDUCATION: DENATURALIZING A REGIME OF TRUTH 12 (Palgrave MacMillan
2018).
128. See Bjeliac-Babic, supra note 118. While most factions in the interna-
tional community do not advocate for this monolinguistic approach, the end of
the nineteenth century saw a rise in people creating artificial languages to per-
fect the ideal. Id.
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Babic,
129
also argue that a third problem that minority lan-
guages face is the rise of digital media, going as far as to say, “A
language not on the Internet is a language that ¶no longer exists’
in the modern world.”
130
Recent trends in social media, however,
have indicated otherwise.
131
It is only in recent years, even after the era of decolonization,
that the world has made an actual push towards preserving and
celebrating minority and mother languages and heritage.
132
The
push in the international community may not be enough, with
some estimates saying that more than half of the world’s 6,000
or so remaining languages will be extinct before the century is
over, given that most of the approximately 2,000 languages on
the endangered language list have less than 10,000 speakers.
133
B. Current Attempts by International Bodies at Revitalizing
Critically Endangered Minority and Mother Cultures and Lan-
guages
Due to the inclination in international law to decolonize and
refranchise native populations, the international community
has also attempted to revitalize and, in some cases, bring back
from the dead critically endangered mother languages and cul-
tures.
134
First, UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration on
129. Ranka Bjeliac-Babic, a respected psycholinguist, is an associate profes-
sor with the Paris Descartes University. For a full list of her publications, see
Ranka Bjeliac-Babic, UNIV. PARIS DESCARTES, http://lpp.parisdes-
cartes.cnrs.fr/people/ranka-bijeljac-babic/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (Fr.).
130. SeeBjeliac-Babic, supra note 118. This article was written in 2000, when
there was less language dissemination occurring on the Internet. The newer
trend in the relationship between language and the Internet has been a greater
preservation and education of minority and mother languages.
131. See, e.g., Alissa Stern, Technology to the Endangered Language Rescue?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alissa-
stern/technology-to-the-endange_b_6225900.html. For an example of how me-
dia is helping Gaelic specifically, see Monica Hunter-Heart, Duolingo Is Keep-
ing Dying Languages on Life Support, INVERSE INNOVATION (June 23, 2017),
https://www.inverse.com/article/32786-duolingo-preserve-extinct-endangered-
languages.
132. See generally Bjeliac-Babic, supra note 118.
133. See Deidre McPhillips, Half of the World’s Languages Could Be Extinct
by 2100, U.S. NEWS (May 23, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-coun-
tries/articles/2017-05-23/half-of-worlds-languages-could-be-extinct-by-2100.
134. See generallyMOSELEY, supra note 15. For Irish language revitalization
efforts specifically, see Cuív, supra note 49, at 16. See alsoHunter-Heart, supra
note 131.
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Cultural Diversity in 2001, which calls on member states to
“giv[e] support to expression, creation and dissemination in the
greatest possible number of languages,” as well as “encourage
linguistic diversity . . . at all levels of education.”
135
It also states
that cultural rights are included in human rights, and that “all
persons have therefore the right to express themselves . . . and
disseminate their work in the language of their choice, and par-
ticularly in their mother tongue.”
136
This declaration was fol-
lowed by the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage in 2003,
137
which declared that “language [is] a
vehicle of . . . intangible cultural heritage.”
138
This move pro-
tected mother and minority languages more fully as a part of
cultural heritage.
139
Rita Izsák, at the time the Independent Expert on minority
issues for the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHRC),
140
went as far as to say that the protection of minority
languages is a human rights obligation.
141
Support for this
135. U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO],
Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity, annex II, ¶¶ 5²6 (Nov. 10, 2001)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity].
136. Id. art. 5 (emphasis added).
137. UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural
Heritage (Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Convention for the Safeguarding of In-
tangible Cultural Heritage]. 176 states have ratified, and/or accepted this doc-
ument; however, the UK is not one of them. See The States Parties to the Con-
vention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, UNESCO,
https://ich.unesco.org/en/states-parties-00024 (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
138. See Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage,
supra note 137, art. 2, ¶ 2(a). Here, “language as a vehicle of the intangible
cultural heritage” is listed as a manifestation of intangible cultural heritage,
which the document aims to protect. See alsoUNESCO, Operational Directives
for the Implementation of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangi-
ble Cultural Heritage, ch. IV, ¶ 107(a) (amended June 1, 2016), which details
that states should “implement measures . . . aimed at promoting the role of
intangible cultural heritage as an instrument of integration and intercultural
dialogue, and promoting multilingual education to include vernacular lan-
guages.” (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. For more information on Rita Izsák’s work as the Independent Expert
on minority issues for the UNHRC, see Rita Izsák-Ndiaye (Hungary), U.N.
OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS.,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/SRMinorities/Pages/RitaIzsak.as
px (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
141. See Protection of Minority Languages is a Human Rights Obligation, UN
Expert Says, U.N. (Mar. 12, 2013),
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stance was clearly demonstrated by the international commu-
nity when the UN General Assembly released the Declaration
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Reli-
gious and Linguistic Minorities.
142
This declaration asserts that
minority communities not only have a right to practice their own
languages, but also that states have the affirmative duty to bear
the cost of education for language revitalization efforts.
143
States must also make efforts to improve the conditions of native
speakers and create an environment conducive for minority cul-
tures, heritage, and languages to be reborn and adapted by
younger generations.
144
In Europe, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted the Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in 1992,
145
which
establishes similar guidelines as the UN with respect to safe-
guarding citizens’ rights to use and learn minority languages.
146
This treaty also adds another layer of protection, as ratifying
states must “take into consideration the needs and wishes ex-
pressed by the groups which use such languages.”
147
The
ECRML also explicitly calls for ratifying states to “eliminate . . .
any unjustified distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
relating to the use of a regional or minority language and in-
tended to discourage or endanger the maintenance or develop-
ment of it.”
148
The CoE indicates in this document that it “re-
spect[s] an inalienable and commonly recognized right [of citi-
zens] to use a regional or minority language,”
149
demonstrating
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44352#.Wgr96hNSxE4. This
article notes that the expert in question was “appointed by the Human Rights
Council to examine and report back, in an unpaid capacity, on specific human
rights themes.” Id.
142. See G.A. Res. 47/135, supra note 27, ¶¶ 2, 4.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 4.
145. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, May 11, 1992,
E.T.S. No.148 [hereinafter ECRML]. It is important to note that the United
Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland signed and ratified this Treaty.
146. Id. at preamble: “Considering that the right to use a regional or minority
language in private and public life is an inalienable right. . . .” Cf. G.A. Res.
47/135, supra note 27, art. 2, ¶ 1: “Persons belonging to . . . linguistic minorities
. . . have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, and to use their own language.”
147. Id. art. 7, ¶ 4.
148. Id. art. 7, ¶ 2.
149. See ECRML, supra note 145, at summary.
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its belief that the use of a mother tongue is a part of its human
rights obligation.
150
C. State Responses to the International Law Efforts to Revital-
ize Endangered Minority Languages
While the international community, as a whole, has generally
recognized the need for the preservation of mother and minority
languages,
151
the individual states that take part in the interna-
tional organs have mixed responses and conflicting implementa-
tions.
152
Given natural time and space constraints, it would be
impossible to do a full study of every state’s stance on linguistic
preservation. Some case studies, however, are necessary to eval-
uate the UK’s actions with regard to mother tongue preserva-
tion, or the lack thereof.
Spain is a good case study for minority language legislation,
since it has a large amount of regional minority languages that
were marginalized up until the late twentieth century.
153
After
1977, when Spain completely overhauled its governmental
structure,
154
it implemented a new, democratically enacted con-
stitution that allows for semi-autonomous regions within the
State, all of whose minority languages are officially recognized
150. This conclusion can be inferred from the use of the word “inalienable,”
which, according to Oxford Dictionaries, means, “Not subject to being taken
away from or given away by the possessor.” Inalienable, OXFORDUNIV. PRESS,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/inalienable (last visited Jan. 16,
2019). In international law, inalienable rights are human rights. See G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world”) (emphasis added).
151. See generally sources cited supra notes 135, 138, and 141.
152. See, e.g., News About the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages, COUNCIL EUR. https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-charter-re-
gional-or-minority-languages/news (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); Innocent Maja,
Towards the Protection of Minority Languages in Africa, N.Y.U HAUSER
GLOBAL L. SCH. PROGRAM (Apr. 2008), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/glob-
alex/Minority_Languages_Africa.html.
153. For more information regarding Spain’s transition from a dictatorship
to a democracy, see generally CHARLESPOWELL, REVISITING SPAIN’STRANSITION
INTODEMOCRACY, ARAB TRANSITIONS IN AMODERNWORLD (Institut Europeu de
la Mediterrania (IEMED) ed. 2016).
154. Id.
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by the State.
155
This recognition is borne from Spain’s desire to
“respect and protect” its linguistic and cultural heritage
156
under
its constitution and its international obligations.
157
Spain is a good case study because of the recent issues that
have arisen due to its position on regional and minority lan-
guages.
158
While this recognition seems to be ideal, the regional
language recognition is only applicable within the specific au-
tonomous region’s borders; the only fully recognized national
language of Spain is Spanish.
159
The recognition of specific lan-
guages in specific areas, as compared to the whole country, cre-
ates a tension with Article 3:3 of the Spanish Constitution re-
garding the languages of Spain.
160
This selective recognition has
created tensions in everyday Spanish politics as well.
161
In Octo-
ber 2017, Spain’s largest minority language group, the Cataloni-
ans, voted to secede from the country, only to have Spain imple-
ment direct rule over the region for the first time since 1977.
162
Opponents of Spain’s language policy have cited other countries,
including Switzerland and Belgium, where citizens have an af-
firmative duty to learn all of the country’s official languages.
163
This could have potentially solved the issue of linguistic tension
155. Ferran Ferrer, Languages, Minorities and Education in Spain: The Case
of Catalonia, 36COMP. EDUC. 187, 189 (2000). See also CONSTITUCIÓNESPAÑOLA
[CONSTITUTION] Dec. 6, 1978, § 3 (Spain) [hereinafter Spanish Constitution].
156. See Spanish Constitution, supra note 155.
157. See G.A. Res. 47/135, supra note 27; see also ECRML, supra note 145.
Spain is bound by both documents as a member of the CoE and the UN.
158. See R. Joseph Huddleston, The Roots of the Catalan Independence Cri-
sis, and What Madrid’s Next Steps Should Be, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2017-10-30/roots-catalan-inde-
pendence-crisis.
159. Ferrer, supra note 155. Ferrer clarifies this full recognition by saying
that the Constitution only “requires citizens to know, and guarantees their
rights to use” Spanish as compared to the regional minority languages. Id. (em-
phasis added).
160. See Spanish Constitution, supra note 155, § 3.3 (“The wealth of the dif-
ferent linguistic forms of Spain is a cultural heritage which shall be especially
respected and protected.”).
161. See Dr. John Walsh, The Catalan Language is Key to Catalonia’s Politi-
cal Crisis, RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS ÉIREANN (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.rte.ie/eile/brainstorm/2017/1127/923110-the-catalan-language-is-
key-to-catalonias-political-crisis/.
162. Huddleston, supra note 158.
163. See R.L.G., Johnson: Languages of Spain ³ How to Make a Country for
Everybody, ECONOMIST (July 30, 2014), https://www.economist.com/blogs/pros-
pero/2014/07/johnson-languages-spain.
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before it reached this point, and it could have prevented themar-
ginalization forced on regional linguistic subgroups of Spain.
On the other end of the language spectrum is France, which
has done nothing in the way of supporting its minority lan-
guages through education, preservation, or dissemination.
164
Its
opposition to recognizing minority and regional languages is cod-
ified in Article 2 of the French Constitution, which states, “The
language of the Republic shall be French.”
165
When France
signed the ECRML, the French government refused to ratify it
due to the wording of the French Constitution.
166
Only in 2014
did the French government create an amendment that permit-
ted the Senate to approve the ratification.
167
As of 2017, France
still has not ratified the ECRML due to concerns of “breaking
the unity of the French nation.”
168
Of the seven languages in France that the ECRML would help
to protect,
169
half are considered endangered under UNESCO’s
164. For more on France’s notably unsupportive language policies, see
French National Assembly Rejects More Protection for Minoritised Languages
in Education, Media, NATIONALIA (Jan 15, 2016), https://www.na-
tionalia.info/new/10693/french-nationalia-assembly-rejects-more-protection-
for-minoritised-languages-in-education-; see also Joshua Melvin, Hypocrisy?
France and Its Regional Languages, LOCAL (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.thelo-
cal.fr/20140123/in-france-there-is-only-one-language.
165. CONSTITUTION FRANÇAISE DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, Oct. 4, 1958, art. 2 (Fr.)
(“La langue de la République est le française.”).
166. See Declaration Contained in the Full Powers Handed to the Secretary
General at the Time of Signature of the Instrument (Fr.), COUNCIL EUR. (May
7, 1999), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conven-
tions/treaty/148/declarations?p_auth=Ne9MJ9tg. France’s Constitution does
not allow for other languages to be spoken in a governmental capacity; it does
not allow for co-recognition of any other language besides French; and it does
not allow for individual minority subsets of French citizens, regardless of re-
gion, to have individualized protections that the Charter affords to linguistic
minorities. Id.
167. See Promoting Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Mi-
nority Languages in France, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/euro-
pean-charter-regional-or-minority-languages/promoting-ratification-in-france
(last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
168. French Senate Buries Ratification of European Charter for Regional and
Minority Languages, NATIONALIA (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.na-
tionalia.info/new/10635/french-senate-buries-ratification-of-european-charter-
for-regional-and-minority-languages.
169. See Promoting Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Mi-
nority Languages in France, supra note 167.
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standards.
170
France’s language policing agency, the Académie
française,
171
has a lot of power over what can and cannot come
into France linguistically, even going as far as preventing baby
names that employ minority languages.
172
Internationally,
France’s policies are considered backwards and contrary to the
cultural heritage preservation movement.
173
David Hicks, chief
of the NGO Eurolang, has gone as far to say that France is a
“pariah”
174
and a “rogue state . . . [that] just has not kept up with
European development.”
175
A final case study to contextualize the Northern Ireland lan-
guage problem is neighboring Republic of Ireland, which shares
the same cultural background. The Republic of Ireland’s Gaelic
language policy should be examined as a case study because of
its geographical proximity, identical minority language in ques-
tion, and shared history of language repression and near-eradi-
cation. In Ireland, there are still communities residing in Gael-
tacht
176
that solely speak Gaelic,
177
a fact that distinguishes Ire-
land from Northern Ireland, where the entire population of
170. SeeMOSELEY, supra note 15. See also French Senate Buries Ratification
of European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, supra note 168.
171. See generally Accueil, ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE, http://www.academie-fran-
caise.fr/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
172. Rory Mulholland, French Court Bans Parents from Using Breton ¶x’ in
Baby Name Saying Incompatible with Law, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 14, 2017),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/14/french-court-bans-parents-using-
breton-n-baby-name-saying-incompatible/.
173. See Simon Hooper, France a ´Rogue Stateµ on Regional Languages, AL
JAZEERA (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fea-
tures/2012/03/201232943156736852.html; see also Promoting Ratification of
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in France, supra
note 167.
174. See Hooper, supra note 173. In the same article, expert Davyth Hicks
compares the UK’s recognition of Welsh as a co-official language favorably
against France’s policy of non-recognition, but does not mention the non-recog-
nition of Gaelic. Id.
175. Id.
176. “Gaeltacht” refers to any geographical location in Ireland where Gaelic
is the primary language, as determined by the Irish government. See generally
The Gaeltacht, ÚDARÁS NA GAELTACHTA, http://www.udaras.ie/en/an-ghaeilge-
an-ghaeltacht/an-ghaeltacht/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). Currently, the govern-
ment identifies parts of seven counties on the main island as part of the Gael-
tacht, as well as six offshore islands. Id.
177. Id.
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Gaelic speakers is learning Gaelic as a second language.
178
Ire-
land’s obligations to preserve and promote Gaelic as a mother
tongue and minority language are more internal than the UK’s
international obligation, since Ireland never signed or ratified
the ECRML.
179
Ireland, however, has made a dedicated effort to
the cause and has cited international strategies for the promo-
tion and integration of minority languages.
180
The Irish Consti-
tution officially recognizes Gaelic as the first official language of
the State, with English being the second.
181
This theme is con-
tinued in the naming of the country.
182
In Article 4, the Consti-
tution declares, “The name of the state is Éire, or, in the English
language, Ireland.”
183
The Constitution was merely declaratory,
however, and since its ratification, many pieces of Irish legisla-
tion have been enacted to further promote Gaelic in order to
change its status from minority to equal footing with English.
184
178. See MOSELEY, supra note 15. Gaelic is “extinct as a first language” in
Northern Ireland. Id.
179. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 148, COUNCIL EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/148/sig-
natures (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
180. The Department of Culture, Heritage and the Gaeltacht writes that its
20-year strategy for the Irish language “promotes a holistic, integrated ap-
proach to the Irish language which is consistent with international best prac-
tice.” 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language, DEP’T CULTURE, HERITAGE &
GAELTACHT (Mar. 7, 2015), https://www.chg.gov.ie/gaeltacht/20-year-strategy-
for-the-irish-language-2010-2030/ (emphasis added).
181. See CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND, July 1, 1937, art. 8, ¶¶ 1²2.
182. Id. art. 4.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. These efforts have included setting up an agency to protect the shrink-
ing Gaeltacht, see Ról, ÚDARÁS NA GAELTACHTA, http://www.udaras.ie/faoin-
udaras/ar-rol (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); requiring that Gaelic be taught in
schools, see generally 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language, 2010²2030,
DEP’T. EDUC. & SKILLS (July 25, 2013), https://www.education.ie/en/Publica-
tions/Policy-Reports/20-Year-Strategy-for-the-Irish-Language-2010-2030.pdf;
and implementing the Official Languages Act 2003 to guarantee that public
bodies utilize Gaelic, see generally OFFICE OF AN COIMISINÉIR TEANGA, REVIEW
OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT 2003 (Apr. 2014), available at
https://www.chg.gov.ie/app/uploads/2016/08/review.pdf. The Official Lan-
guages Act 2003 is considered the most widespread language scheme since it
is the first time that the government statutorily mandated that all public ser-
vices must be offered in Gaelic as well as English. See OFFICE OF AN
COIMISINÉIR TEANGA, OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT 2003 GUIDEBOOK 1 (2016),
available at https://www.chg.gov.ie/app/uploads/2015/07/Guidebook-Oifig-an-
Choimisineara-Teanga-Version4.pdf [hereinafter OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT
2003 GUIDEBOOK] (last visited Jan. 8, 2019).
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While these efforts to promote the Gaelic language have varied
in success, the Official Languages Act of 2003 has been the most
extensive.
185
The Act mandated that all public services, admin-
istrative functions, government proceedings, and documents be
offered in both English and Gaelic, helping to tip the scales in
favor of language equality.
186
The Official Languages Act also
created an entirely new administrative arm of the government
just for the Gaeltacht, so that native Irish speakers could be ad-
equately represented.
187
This initiative is supported by regular
language scheme action updates, as well as a twenty-year strat-
egy plan whose goal is to have 250,000 regular Irish speakers by
2030.
188
In 2007, the same year that the Taoiseach
189
unveiled
the plan, Ireland managed to have Gaelic recognized as an offi-
cial EU language.
190
In 2005, the EU announced that Gaelic
would be a “full working language” by 2022, meaning that all
current and future EU documents will be translated and made
available in Gaelic.
191
III. PRESERVATION OFMOTHER ANDMINORITY LANGUAGES IN
THEUNITEDKINGDOM OF BRITAIN ANDNORTHERN IRELAND
The UK has, in its territories other than Northern Ireland,
closely followed the ECRML.
192
Not only did the UK facilitate
185. OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT 2003 GUIDEBOOK, supra note 184, at 2.
186. See About the Act, AN COIMISINÉIR TEANGA, https://www.coimis-
ineir.ie/faoin-acht?lang=EN (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
187. OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT 2003 GUIDEBOOK, supra note 184, at 2.
188. See 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language, supra note 180.
189. Taoiseach is the Gaelic “chieftain” or “leader,” and is the official name of
the Irish Prime Minister. To learn more about the role of the Taoiseach, see
Role of the Taeoiseach, ROI AN TOISIGH, https://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Taoi-
seach_and_Government/About_the_Taoiseach/Role_of_the_Taoiseach/ (last
visited Dec. 3, 2018).
190. David McKittrick, Ireland Becomes the 23rd Official Language of the
EU, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 3, 2007), http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/europe/irish-becomes-the-23rd-official-language-of-eu-
430615.html.
191. Ann Cahill, Gaeilge to Become a Full Working Language of the European
Union, IRISH EXAMINER (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.irishexaminer.com/ire-
land/gaeilge-to-become-a-full-working-language-of-the-european-union-
386308.html.
192. See European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Application
of the Charter in the United Kingdom, 4
th
Monitoring Cycle, COUNCIL EUR.
§1.3, ¶ 11 (Jan. 15, 2014), https://rm.coe.int/16806dcc8d. The report says that
besides lack of census or progress in Northern Ireland “the fourth periodical
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mother tongue legislation for both Scotland and Wales,
193
but it
also established a comprehensive future action plan in Scotland,
including long-term goals and an actionable timeline.
194
In
Wales, the government releases action plans for every fiscal
year, as well as an implementation plan for future actions.
195
Although the UK has enacted this legislation in Wales and
Scotland
196
and has implemented future action plans, Gaelic
speakers in Northern Ireland have not received the same cour-
tesy.
197
Given the way that power is shared between Westmin-
ster and each territory’s home government, this lack of language
legislation says more about the Northern Irish government than
it does about Westminster,
198
since most of the progress that oc-
curred and is still occurring in Wales and Scotland is due to at-
report is more coherent . . . and deals with most of the relevant issues that had
been raised in the previous monitoring round.” Id. (emphasis added). It goes on
to give favorable progress reports on almost all previous recommendations for
other UK languages (Cornish, Welsh, Ulster-Scots, etc.) except for Irish lan-
guage policy and implementation. Id. at 7²15.
193. SeeWales Act, supra note 9.
194. See generally The Scottish Government Gaelic Language Plan, 2015 to
2020, SCOTTISH GOV’T (RIAGHALTAS NA AH-ALBA) (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://beta.gov.scot/publications/scottish-government-gaelic-language-plan-
2015-2020-draft-consultation/. This plan includes education initiatives, staff-
ing and training in the language, and media usage. Id.
195. See generally Welsh Language Strategy: Action Plan, LLYWODRAETH
CYMRU WELSH GOV’T, http://gov.wales/topics/welshlanguage/welsh-language-
strategy-and-policies/welsh-language-policies-upto-2017/wl-strategy-action-
plan-2015-2016/ (last updated Mar. 1, 2016).
196. See Wales Act, supra note 9; see Scotland Act, supra note 9. Each of
these pieces of legislation made their regions’ respective mother tongues co-
official with English and also reaffirms commitments to preservation and dis-
semination of the languages through education, administration, media, and
other platforms. The Wales Language Act states, “English and Welsh lan-
guages should be treated on a basis of equality, to make further provision re-
lating to the Welsh language, to repeal certain spent enactments relating to
Wales, and for connected purposes.” SeeWales Act, supra note 9, at preamble.
The Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act of 2006 declares its purpose as “securing
the status of the Gaelic language as an official language of Scotland command-
ing equal respect to the English language” and details the exact areas of im-
plementation. See Scotland Act, supra note 9, at preamble.
197. See European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Application
of the Charter in the United Kingdom, 4
th
Monitoring Cycle, supra note 192.
198. Id. at 5. The UK has devolved “the responsibility of competence with
regard to regional or minority languages . . . to the Northern Ireland Assem-
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home legislation.
199
Both the Northern Irish Assembly andWest-
minster, however, havemade promises in that thread, enshrined
in the Good Friday Agreement
200
and later in the St Andrews
Agreement.
201
The overarching paragraph regarding Gaelic in the Good Fri-
day Agreement specifically cites the UK’s signing of the ECRML
and its ongoing commitment to uphold its principles.
202
The
Agreement also states, however, that the British government
will only take action “where appropriate and where the people so
desire it.”
203
The agreement goes on to list its goals with regards
to the language, including education, media, and, “facilitat[ing]
and encourag[ing] the use of the language in . . . public and pri-
vate life.”
204
Notably, the last provision in the Agreement allows
the Northern Irish Assembly the power to implement these
changes.
205
The Agreement states, “[The British Government
will] encourage the parties to secure agreement that this com-
mitment will be sustained by a new Assembly in a way which
takes account of the desires and sensitivities of the commu-
nity.”
206
Implementation efforts by the government included
207
bly,” and the experts were told that the Assembly has not implemented lan-
guage policy due to the “need to obtain consensus within the power sharing
administration.” Id.
199. See generally ECRML, supra note 145. Throughout the report are details
of Welsh and Scottish governments’ implementing language policies in educa-
tion, administration, and media to better preserve their mother tongues.
200. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 12, at 24, ¶ 4.
201. See St Andrews Agreement, supra note 4, pt. 1, ¶ 15. “The Executive
Committee shall adopt a strategy setting out how it proposes to enhance and
protect the development of the Irish language.” The Northern Ireland (St An-
drews Agreement) Act of 2006 was written after a period of unrest and North-
ern Ireland Assembly suspensions that resulted in Westminster taking over
direct rule, ending with another devolution of power to a new Northern Ireland
Assembly and reaffirmation of the Good Friday Agreement. Id. See also The St
Andrews Agreement (2006) and the St Andrews Agreement Act (2007), N. IR.
ASSEMBLY, http://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolu-
tion/st_andrews (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). The section in question is meant
to add to the original language in the Good Friday Agreement. Id.
202. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 12, at 24, ¶ 3.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. For an exhaustive list of implementation efforts, see Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies, Official Language and Symbol: Northern Ireland
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an island-wide agency that promotes Gaelic and supports edu-
cation reforms to incorporate language classes
208
and the crea-
tion of the Center Community Relations Unit (CCRU).
209
The
CCRU was created specifically to help develop a language use
policy that would reincorporate Gaelic into the community.
210
The St Andrews Agreement takes commitment to language
preservation a step further, stating that “[t]he Government will
introduce an Irish Language Act reflecting on the experience of
Wales and Ireland and work with the incoming Executive to en-
hance and protect the development of the Irish language.”
211
The
Act was signed by Sinn Féin, the DUP, and the British govern-
ment; however, there is a debate as to whether all parties were
in agreement with this provision.
212
This uncertainty has yet
again led to unrest, since the DUP argues that the government
mentioned in Annex B of the Act is Westminster; therefore, Brit-
ain agreed to an Irish Language Act, not the DUP.
213
The DUP
further argues that given the language of the agreement, all it
has to do is “work . . . to enhance and protect the development of
the Irish language”
214
The DUP argues it has done that.
215
On
the other side, Sinn Féin argues that because it signed the St
Good Friday Agreement, U. NOTRE DAME (2015), https://peaceac-
cords.nd.edu/provision/official-language-and-symbol-northern-ireland-good-fri-
day-agreement.
208. See generally The Functions of Foras na Gaeilge, FORAS NA GAEILGE,
http://www.forasnagaeilge.ie/about/about-foras-na-gaeilge/?lang=en (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2017).
209. See Background Information on CCRU, CENTER COMMUNITY REL. UNIT
(Feb. 1, 2018), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ccru/background/background.htm.
210. See CCRU Home, CENTER COMMUNITY REL. UNIT,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ccru/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). This unit became defunct
in 2000. Id.
211. See Agreement at St Andrews, supra note 12, annex B, at 11. Note that
this section is entitled “HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY, VICTIMS AND
OTHER ISSUES,” showing the UK’s acknowledgment that minority language
preservation is a human right. Id.
212. See FactCheck: Did the DUP Really Never Commit to an Irish Language
Act?, THEJOURNAL.IE (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.thejournal.ie/factcheck-irish-
language-act-3209218-Jan2017/. See also Jonny Bell, DUP Never Agreed to
Irish Language Act at St. Andrews, Says Edwin Poots, BELFAST TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ire-
land/dup-never-agreed-to-irish-language-act-at-st-andrews-says-edwin-poots-
35373553.html.
213. See Agreement at St Andrews, supra note 12.
214. Id.
215. Id.
302 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:1
Andrews Agreement, the DUP must also uphold the agreement
and work with Britain and Sinn Féin to implement the Act.
216
This has led to the current deadlock of Stormont.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLYDEADLOCK AND ANEW
PROPOSAL
Since the Stormont Deadlock, which occurred in January 2017,
many negotiations have occurred between Sinn Féin and the
DUP to restore the Assembly, but one of the major sticking
points has been the proposed Irish Language Act.
217
Sinn Féin
has argued that the DUP has not upheld all of its commitments
to the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agree-
ment.
218
Sinn Féin also argues that the true reason for the DUP’s
reticence on an Irish Language Act is discrimination against na-
tionalists.
219
The DUP argues that an Irish Language Act is too
expensive for the stated benefit, and that there are other ways
to preserve and promote Gaelic without a dedicated Act.
220
The
DUP’s rebuttal to accusations of discrimination is that Sinn Féin
is using the language as a “¶Trojan Horse’ to fracture Union-
ism,”
221
as Gerry Moriarty
222
aptly explained, and that national-
ists want the DUP to go beyond what was bargained for.
223
216. See FactCheck: Did the DUP Really Never Commit to an Irish Language
Act?, supra note 212.
217. Id.
218. See John Manley, What Would an Irish Language Act Actually Mean?,
IRISH NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.irishnews.com/news/political-
news/2017/02/08/news/what-would-an-irish-language-act-actually-mean³
924164/.
219. Gerry Moriarty, Why is the Irish Language Choking Up Politics in the
North?, IRISH TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/poli-
tics/why-is-the-irish-language-choking-up-politics-in-the-north-1.3273354.
220. SeeManley, supra note 218.
221. See Moriarty, supra note 219. The Irish leader Danny Morrison once
said, “Every word of Irish spoken is like another bullet being fired in the strug-
gle for Irish freedom,” which has been cited by the DUP as showing Sinn Féin’s
true motives as to why its members are pushing an Irish Language Act. Id.
222. Gerry Moriarty is the Irish Times’ editor who covers Northern Ireland
news. For more of his work, see Gerry Moriarty, IRISH TIMES,
https://www.irishtimes.com/profile/gerry-moriarty-7.1837417 (last visited Jan.
15, 2019).
223. SeeMoriarty, supra note 219.
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A. The DUP and Sinn Féin’s Past and Current Stances on the
Irish Language Issue
The original position of the DUP was that of outright opposi-
tion; it has since shifted this opinion, with Arlene Foster prom-
ising that the DUP will legislate an Irish Language Act “within
a set period of time” if Sinn Féin breaks the deadlock and re-
stores power-sharing.
224
Sinn Féin rejected this proposal, finding
it not to be credible and wanting a more permanent solution.
225
Sinn Féin leader, Michelle O’Neill, speaking about the proposal,
said, “Let’s agree to quickly conclude talks on implementation
and rights, that is the only way to build a sustainable Executive
that will last.”
226
The DUP’s other stance on a standalone Irish Language Act is
that it should be encompassed into a larger “Culture Act,” which
would include language protection for both Gaelic and the coun-
try’s other minority language, Ulster-Scots.
227
To Sinn Féin and
its supporters, this proposal is unacceptable because Ulster-
Scots does not have the same historical tension with the English
language or the same history with the island of Ireland.
228
Sinn
Féin also argues that the Gaelic-speaking community is more
marginalized by the Unionists than Ulster-Scots speakers.
229
There is also a question as to the DUP’s motivations in offering
such a compromise.
230
The Ulster-Scots community is less con-
cerned with language recognition on a governmental level than
224. Suzanne Breen, Sinn Féin Dismisses Arlene Foster’s Proposal to Legis-
late for Irish Language in a Revived Stormont, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Sept. 1,
2017), https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/sinn-Féin-
dismisses-arlene-fosters-proposal-to-legislate-for-irish-language-in-a-revived-
stormont-36089669.html.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Ciaran Dunbar, Northern Ireland Assembly Divided by Irish lan-
guage, BBC NEWS (June 28, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-38601181.
228. Id.
229. Id. There are also less Ulster-Scots speakers than Irish speakers, but
only marginally: 8 percent of the population, or about 140,000 people, speaks
Ulster-Scots, while 10 percent of the population, or approximately 179,000 peo-
ple, speaks Irish Gaelic. See Robbie Meredith, Ulster-Scots ¶Forgotten in Some
Ways,’ BBC NEWS (June 28, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-40437157.
230. See Henry McDonald, Irish Language Act Hampering Northern Ireland
Power-Sharing, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/jun/27/irish-language-act-hampering-northern-ireland-power-
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with the need for funding in education, cultural development,
and media.
231
The community would prefer legislation to pro-
mote respect of the language and help keep it alive.
232
Jack Kyle,
a fluent Ulster-Scots speaker from Ballymoney, was quoted as
saying that “[t]he stakes are high . . . we just don’t want to see it
[Ulster-Scots] dying out.”
233
With only an estimated 100,000 na-
tive speakers of Ulster Scots left, the concern is very real for the
community.
234
Sinn Féin has also, in some ways, softened from its original
stance on affirmative Irish language legislation, but it still in-
sists on a standalone bill.
235
Sinn Féin’s original stance origi-
nated from an Irish language proposal set forth in 2015 by the
Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure, which called for af-
firmative action in civil service positions of native Irish speak-
ers.
236
Some news reports, which have since been debunked, said
that the proposed legislation would require 10 percent of the
civil service positions to go to Irish speakers.
237
Sinn Féin even-
tually ruled out any form of this portion of the proposal, only
supporting the other provisions, which include co-official lan-
guage status with English in the government and bilingual sign-
age.
238
Its current position supporting an Irish Language Act is
sharing-talks (“The DUP had tried to incorporate aspects of Ulster Scots lan-
guage and culture . . . as political cover against criticism from hardline unionist
opponents.”).
231. SeeMeredith, supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See An Introduction to the Ulster-Scots Language, ULSTER SCOTS
AGENCY, https://www.ulsterscotsagency.com/what-is-ulster-scots/language/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
235. See Jonathan Bell, Sinn Féin Rules Out Affirmative Action for Irish
Speakers in Civil Service, BELFASTTELEGRAPH (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.bel-
fasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/sinn-Féin-rules-out-affirmative-ac-
tion-for-irish-speakers-in-civil-service-36102729.html.
236. For the original proposal, see TOGRAÍ FAOI CHOINNE BILLE GAEILGE
(PROPOSALS FOR AN IRISHLANGUAGEBILL) (An Roinn Cultúir, Ealaíon agus Fóil-
líochta (Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure)) 12 (2015).
237. Jonathan Bell, Sinn Féin Dismisses 10% Irish Speakers in Civil Service
Demand Claim as ¶Bunkum’, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (July 5, 2017),
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/sinn-Féin-dismisses-10-
irish-speakers-in-civil-service-demand-claim-as-bunkum-35898048.html.
238. See Bell, Sinn Féin Rules Out Affirmative Action for Irish Speakers in
Civil Service, supra note 235.
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a standalone act that protects Irish Gaelic as a minority lan-
guage with equal status to English, similar to the Welsh lan-
guage in Wales.
239
This status would allow for translations of all
court proceedings, bilingual signage, Gaelic name recognition of
towns, and improved Gaelic language instruction in public
schools.
240
The DUP argues that the Irish Language Act is Sinn Féin’s
way of seeking “cultural supremacy,”
241
and that the proposed
legislation forces non-Irish speakers to deal with the language
“even where it’s not wanted,” as DUP MP Sammy Wilson has
explained.
242
The DUP’s other argument, which has since been
shelved with its unveiling of the Cultural Act proposal,
243
ad-
dressed the cost of an Irish Language Act on the tax base.
244
239. See Sean Murray, Adams Says Young People Will Be Radicalised by the
DUP’s Refusal to Embrace Their Rights, THEJOURNAL.IE (Aug. 31, 2017),
http://www.thejournal.ie/irish-language-act-gerry-adams-3573478-Aug2017/.
240. Id.
241. See Henry McDonald, Sinn Féin Denies Seeking ¶Cultural Supremacy’
via Irish Language Act, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/politics/2017/jul/02/sinn-fein-denies-seeking-cultural-supremacy-via-
irish-language-act.
242. Rónán Duffy, DUP MP Says Act for ¶Failing’ Irish Language Would Be
Discriminatory, THEJOURNAL.IE (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.thejour-
nal.ie/sammy-wilson-irish-language-act-3583868-Sep2017/. The comment re-
garding “wanting” bilingual signage may be in response to the multiple in-
stances of vandalized bilingual signs that have occurred already in Northern
Ireland. See Gareth McKeown, Irish Language Council Sign Defaced Yet
Again, IRISH NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.irish-
news.com/news/2017/02/10/news/irish-language-council-sign-defaced-yet-
again-926852/.
243. DUP leader Arlene Foster proposed the Culture Act, which encompasses
language recognition to both Ulster-Scots and Gaelic, as a way to compromise
with Sinn Féin, but would not agree with a standalone Irish Language Act. See
Why Is There an Impasse in Northern Ireland Over the Irish Language?,
BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.belfasttele-
graph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/why-is-there-an-impasse-in-northern-ire-
land-over-the-irish-language-36604629.html. This proposed legislation would
also be less comprehensive than any Irish Language Act with regard to protec-
tions, since it would not include translating road signs or be making room for
Gaelic-speaking workers. Id.
244. JohnManley,What Would an Irish Language Act Cost? And What Might
the Legislation Contain?, IRISH NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.irish-
news.com/news/2017/10/02/news/irish-language-act-content-and-cost-
1150668/.
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There is also a question as to whether a standalone Irish Lan-
guage Act would be contrary to the equality provision
245
in the
Good Friday Agreement.
246
The long-term goal of Sinn Féin³or at least the organization’s
more senior members³is for a new referendum on the unifica-
tion of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.
247
Sinn
Féin leader, Gerry Adams, has expressed his party’s hope for a
referendum to unite Ireland in the next five years, but will not
seek a referendum during the Stormont Deadlock.
248
The DUP,
while “supremely optimistic” that a poll would fail to unite Ire-
land at this time,
249
does not want to hold a referendum because
it would be “destabilizing to the body politic, to the economy and
wider society and [the DUP doesn’t] believe it is wise at this
time.”
250
Another factor that all parties are waiting on is the out-
come of the Brexit debacle, which studies have suggested would
influence a united Ireland referendum.
251
B. Proposed Solution to the Irish Language Act Controversy for
an End of the Stormont Deadlock
One matter that the DUP, Sinn Féin, and their allies all agree
upon is that moving the government back to Westminster under
direct rule would not be best for devolution or for peace in North-
ern Ireland. The DUP, however, would be willing to allow direct
rule to happen.
252
Sinn Féin’s hardline attitude is reflected in its
245. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 12, at 24, § 3.
246. Henry McDonald, Proposed Irish Language Act Could Breach Good Fri-
day Deal, Lawyer Says, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/10/proposed-irish-language-act-could-breach-good-
friday-northern-ireland-deal-lawyer-says.
247. Adams Seeks Irish Unity ReferendumWithin Five Years, RAIDIÓTEILIFÍS
ÉIREANN (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.rte.ie/news/politics/2017/0905/902351-
sinn-Féin-think-in/.
248. Id.
249. Id. In the same interview, the speaker, ex-DUP Economic Minister Si-
mon Hamilton, also compared an Irish unification referendum to the failed
2014 Scottish referendum and its destabilizing effect. Id.
250. Id.
251. Ben Kelly, Why Is There No Government in Northern Ireland and How
Did Power-Sharing Collapse?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/northern-ireland-talks-latest-updates-stor-
mont-power-sharing-deal-what-deal-look-sinn-fein-dup-deal-a8711691.html.
252. Michael Staines, New Northern Ireland Secretary ´Absolutely Deter-
minedµ to Restore Powersharing, NEWSTALK (Jan. 10, 2018),
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unwillingness to consider a Culture Act. The stubbornness of
both parties, however, has already resulted in a budget being
passed by Westminster.
253
This action has marked a step closer
to direct English rule, demonstrating Westminster’s belief that
neither party is capable of putting aside its differences long
enough to keep the Northern Irish government operational.
254
The threat of a no-deal Brexit also looms, promising conse-
quences ranging from an even more unpopular direct rule sce-
nario, to an increased chance of a successful Irish unification ref-
erendum.
255
In order to end the Stormont Deadlock with the Northern Irish
government intact, the DUP and Sinn Féin must compromise on
legislation that will frame the Irish language as equal to English
in Northern Ireland. The DUP’s excuse that it did not agree to
this legislation in the St Andrews Agreement may be correct.
256
To maintain its slim majority, however, the DUP must stop al-
ienating the populace with outright discriminatory policies and
rhetoric.
257
Given that the DUP’s Culture Act proposal seemed
to be in good faith, Sinn Féin should suggest separate Acts that
would sufficiently encompass the needs of both the Gaelic speak-
ers and the Ulster-Scots speakers. These separate but equal lan-
guage Acts would not necessarily need to present a matching
timeline for the two languages to be integrated, or identical
funding allocation. The Acts should be equally protective of Ul-
ster Scots and Gaelic, however, to sufficiently appease the DUP
and avoid direct rule.
A proposal that includes Ulster Scots and Gaelic would also
prevent Sinn Féin from losing any more seats to the current
DUP majority, which would upset the power sharing struc-
ture.
258
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, supporting equal
language legislation for both of Ireland’s minority languages
promotes cultural heritage preservation, and indicates Sinn
http://www.newstalk.com/New-Northern-Ireland-Secretary-absolutely-deter-
mined-to-restore-powersharing.
253. Ronan Duffy, ¶This is British Direct Rule’ Says SDLP Leader, as West-
minster Passes North Budget, THEJOURNAL.IE (Nov. 14, 2017),
http://www.thejournal.ie/northern-ireland-budget-3695641-Nov2017/.
254. Id.
255. Ben Kelly, supra note 251.
256. See FactCheck: Did the DUP Really Never Commit to an Irish Language
Act?, supra note 212.
257. See, e.g., supra notes 14, 16²18.
258. See Power Sharing, supra note 109.
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Féin’s acceptance of the diverse linguistic population. As Peter
Robinson, the previous First Minister and DUP founding mem-
ber, has asked, “Who can complain if there are those who cherish
Irish language or who passionately support Ulster-Scots cul-
ture? Who can find it unacceptable for arrangements to be put
on a statutory basis to protect and support both? Both can be
accommodated.”
259
He is correct in that both languages should
be equally protected as minority languages in Northern Ireland,
and Sinn Féin can only strengthen its position by supporting
both languages.
Given the way that DUP leader, Arlene Foster has acted in the
past year and her purported refusal to entertain a deal such as
the one outlined above,
260
it is clearly time to have a change of
leadership through a snap election
261
in order for comprehensive
and all-encompassing language legislation to be presented and
implemented. The current political climate
262
in the UK and the
twentieth anniversary of the St Andrews Agreement’s passage
in April 2018
263
suggest that the time for compromise is now if
the government of Northern Ireland wished to maintain its au-
tonomy from both the UK and the Republic of Ireland. If Foster
259. SeeMcDonald, supra note 230.
260. In February 2018, there was conflicting reports that Sinn Féin proposed
a deal that would include both Ulster Scots and Gaelic language bills. Jona-
than Bell, Sinn Fein Reveal Details of DUP Deal: Irish and Ulster Scots Lan-
guage Acts, Petition of Concern Review and Justice Ministry Change, BELFAST
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/north-
ern-ireland/sinn-fein-reveal-details-of-dup-deal-irish-and-ulster-scots-lan-
guage-acts-petition-of-concern-review-and-justice-ministry-change-
36608559.html. Foster stated that the deal was not one she could bring to her
party, seeming to indicate that a deal was proposed and quickly shut down. Id.
261. A “snap election” is a form of election in parliamentary democracies
when “the party in power . . . initiate[s] a general election sooner than the fixed-
term deadline.” See Snap Election, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.mac-
millandictionaryblog.com/snap-election (last visited Jan. 16, 2019). In 2017,
Sinn Féin initiated a snap election in response to McGuinness’ resignation and
First Minister Arlene Foster’s refusal to resign. The results closed the gap in
seat majority that the DUP held over Sinn Féin from ten seats to one. For more
information on the 2017 snap election, see Kristin Archick, Northern Ireland’s
Snap Elections: Outcome and Implications, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS (Mar. 7,
2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10663.pdf.
262. See generally Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need to Know
About the UK Leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.
263. See Northern Ireland: New Faces, Old Problems, WEEK (Jan. 11, 2018),
http://www.theweek.co.uk/90865/northern-ireland-new-faces-old-problems.
2018] Chancing the Arm to Save the Face 309
is not the leader that she needs to be, an election must be held
to redistribute the party lines and bring in more accountable
leaders.
CONCLUSION
This article discussed, in length, the history of Anglo-Irish ten-
sions, how those tensions culminated in the government that ex-
ists today, and why that tenuous peace is so important to main-
tain in one of Europe’s most conflicted areas. It also discussed
the need to not only acknowledge, but to also correct the wrongs
committed against minority language speakers and those who
wish to explore their cultural heritage in the aftermath of colo-
nialism. These needs must be balanced with the need for politi-
cal stability and the rights of the people to reclaim their heritage
through language. To reclaim and sustain this cultural heritage,
factions must put aside their differences, drill a hole in the wall,
and chance the arm. That is the only way to keep Northern Ire-
land safe, stable, and culturally robust.
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